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Attention MRS MULLETT

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

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Subject: Secretary's Statement on SALT

Attached is a copy of the Secretary's "Statement in Support of the SALT Agreements" as finally revised. The Secretary will deliver this statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today, June 19.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

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STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE SALT AGREEMENTS

TO THE

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Monday, June 19, 1972

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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June 19, 1972

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Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to appear before you in support of the Treaty on the limitation of ABM systems and the Interim Agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

In his letter to the Senate of June 13 transmitting my report and its enclosures, the President urged your support so that the two agreements can be brought into force as soon as practicable. These agreements are important not just for our people; they are important for all people. They are important not only for the achievements they represent, but also for the opportunities they present. Strategic arms limitation is not a one-time effort but a continuing process.

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These agreements are a significant achievement.

They constitute an unprecedented step in controlling strategic arms. They are tangible evidence that both sides are moving into an era of negotiation. The two sides now have an important investment in cooperation which they are not likely to risk lightly. The U.S. and the Soviet Union have thus indicated a recognition that their relations can be improved by cooperation in some areas even though there remain important differences in others.

This success in SALT recognizes that global security is interdependent, and that unconstrained weapons competition is contrary to the interests of the nuclear powers, and of the world.

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During the SALT negotiations over the last two and a half years we have kept in mind the need for wide support, both nationally and internationally, for any agreements reached. To that end the Administration has closely consulted the Congress. We have also regularly consulted with our Allies.

I believe there is wide support for these agreements.

The Administration welcomes this opportunity to consider them with you. We are pleased to know that the Congress plans full consideration of these two documents, both with officials of the Executive Branch and with the public. This is a process that is fundamental to our American system. It will broaden the base of understanding and support for what has been

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achieved, and will assist in the search for additional strategic arms limitations.

III.

Let me place the SALT agreements in perspective.

When this Administration entered office early in 1969, we faced a strategic situation in which the USSR was engaged in a broad and dynamic buildup of its strategic offensive missile launchers. It was clear that a rough balance in strategic forces between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was approaching. However, there was not then — and there is not now — any question that the U.S. could and would maintain strategic forces adequate to meet its security requirements and second to none. As President Nixon stated in his Foreign Policy

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Report of February, 1970, "both sides would almost surely commit the necessary resources to maintain a balance." The President further noted that any Soviet attempt to obtain a large advantage "would spark an arms race which would, in the end, prove pointless."

Through negotiation -- rather than competition -- we had an opportunity to achieve a more stable strategic relationship with the USSR and to seek -- over time -- to create a situation in which both sides could use more of their resources for purposes other than building more strategic weapons.

IV.

After thorough preparations by the new Administration, SALT began in November, 1969, in Helsinki. Initially, the

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talks concentrated on exploration of strategic principles and development of an agenda for future work. The next phases focused on comprehensive proposals. However, problems over definition of strategic systems and over the basis for limitation of such systems made clear that it would be extremely difficult to negotiate a single comprehensive agreement. The Soviets then pressed for an initial agreement limiting only anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. We believed that such an agreement would not make as great a contribution to stability as limitations on both offensive and defensive strategic systems.

This impasse was resolved by the breakthrough announced by the President on May 20, 1971. The two Governments agreed to work out arrangements limiting deployment

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of ABMs, and at the same time to agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

After the May 20 understanding, the principal issues were how broad a coverage of offensive forces could be agreed, and how to frame in concrete terms agreement in principle to limit ABMs to a low level. These general questions contained numerous and complex specific issues, which took another year of hard negotiating to work out. The two agreements before you are the successful result of that work.

V.

Mr. Chairman, a detailed analysis of the two agreements was made in my letter of submittal to the President. I believe it would be helpful this morning to consider what these agreements

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would do. -I will touch on certain of their most important provisions. Following my statement, Ambassador Smith is prepared to join me in answering questions you may have.

Let me say as a preface to this discussion that in both agreements the U.S. has sought, where necessary, to set forth detailed obligations in the texts of the agreements themselves. Where one of the sides preferred to put clarifying material or elaboration in Agreed Interpretations, and where this was sufficient, that approach was used. These Agreed Interpretations have been transmitted to the Congress; they include initialled statements and other common understandings. In certain cases where agreement could not be reached, U.S. views were stated

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formally in unilateral statements. Those, too, have been transmitted to the Congress. There are no secret agreements.

VI.

I would like to address first the ABM Treaty.

Under this Treaty, both sides make a commitment not to build a nation-wide ABM defense. This is a general undertaking of utmost significance. Without a nation-wide ABM defense, there can be no shield against retaliation. Both great nuclear powers have recognized, and in effect agreed to maintain mutual deterrence.

Therefore, I am convinced beyond doubt that the possibility of nuclear war has been dramatically reduced by this Treaty.

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- A major objective of SALT has been to reduce the tensions, uncertainties and high costs which flow from the upward spiral of strategic arms competition. While the cost savings from these first SALT agreements will be limited initially, over the long term we will save the tens of billions of dollars which might otherwise have been required for a nation-wide ABM defense.

Furthermore with an interim limitation on offensive weapons — which we hope will lead to a more comprehensive and permanent limitation — there will be a break in the pattern of action and reaction under

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which each side reacts to what the other is doing; or may do, in an open-ended situation. This cycle until now has been a major factor in driving the strategic arms race.

The heart of the Treaty is Article III, which spells out the provisions under which each of the parties may deploy two limited ABM complexes, one in an ICBM deployment area, and one at its national capital. There can be no more than 100 ABM launchers, and 100 associated interceptors, at each complex — a total of 200.

The two ABM deployment complexes permitted each side will serve different purposes. The limited ABM coverage in the ICBM deployment area will afford some protection for ICBMs in the area. ABM coverage at the national capitals will permit

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protection for the National Command Authority against a light attack, or an accidental or unauthorized launch of a limited number of missiles, and thus decrease the chances that such an event would trigger a nuclear exchange. In addition, it will buy some time against a major attack, and its radars would help to provide valuable warning.

ABM radars are strictly limited. There are also important limitations on the deployment of certain types of non-ABM radars. The complex subject of radar control was a central question in the negotiations because radars are the long lead-time item in development of an ABM system.

The treaty provides for other important qualitative limitations. The parties will undertake not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based,

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space-based or mobile land-based. They have also agreed not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify launchers to provide them with such a capability; nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers; nor to develop, test, or deploy ABM missiles with more than one independently guided warhead.

Perhaps of even greater importance as a qualitative limitation is that the parties have agreed that future exotic types of ABM systems, i.e. systems depending on such devices as lasers, may not be deployed, even in permitted areas.

One of the more important corollary provisions deals with prohibiting the upgrading of anti-aircraft systems, what has been called the "SAM-upgrade" problem. The conversion or testing of other systems, such as air-defense systems or components thereof, to perform an ABM role is prohibited as part of a general undertaking not to provide an ABM

capability to non-ABM systems.

The undertakings in the ABM Treaty, and in the Interim Agreement, have been devised so as to assure that they can be verified by national technical means of verification. For the types of arms control measures in these agreements, modern national technical means of verification are the most practical and a fully effective assurance of compliance. The Treaty also contains the very important landmark commitments not to interfere with each side's national technical means of verification and not to use deliberate concealment measures to impede the effectiveness of these means.

The Treaty contains another significant "first" in Soviet-American arms control. A Standing Consultative

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Commission will, on a regular basis, consider the operations of the Treaty as well as questions of compliance. The Commission will also have the function of considering proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty. It will assure that even after the completion of the follow-on negotiations there will be a continuing strategic dialogue between the two powers.

The duration of the ABM Treaty is unlimited. But it contains a withdrawal clause of the kind which has characterized post-war arms control agreements. Each party can withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events relating to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Notice of such a decision, including

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a statement of the extraordinary events involved, must be given six months prior to withdrawal.

VII.

The interrelationship between limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms which the US has repeatedly stressed is reflected in the expressed intention to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic arms. As was pointed out in my submittal letter, the special importance attached by the United States to this relationship was set forth in a formal statement by Ambassador Smith recording the position of the United States Government that if an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years,

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US supreme interests could be jeopardized, and should that occur it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the Treaty. I believe that this withdrawal right, which is exercisable on our judgment alone, fully protects our security interests in the event that the follow-on negotiations were not to succeed and that the strategic situation became such that we felt obliged to exercise it.

VIII.

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to turn to the Interim Agreement and its Protocol.

This Agreement freezes at approximately current levels the aggregate number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM)

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launchers operational and under construction on each side for up to five years. We hope that it will be replaced well before that time by a more complete agreement in treaty form covering strategic offensive weapons.

Under the Agreement, in Articles I and II, the parties undertake a commitment not to construct additional fixed ICBM launchers and not to convert launchers for light or older ICBMs into launchers for modern heavy ICBMs. This undertaking by the Soviet Union should be viewed in terms of the concern in this country during the past several years about the continued buildup in numbers of Soviet ICBMs, particularly the heavy SS-9 ICBMs. The growth in numbers of both light and heavy Soviet ICBM launchers has now been stopped.

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The Agreement does not specify the number of ICBMs operational and under construction when it was signed. We have made it abundantly clear to the Soviets, however, that we consider this number for the USSR to be 1618. Specifying the number of ICBMs in the Agreement is not important, since national means of verification will reveal if any new ICBM construction, which is prohibited by the Agreement, were to take place.

Article III and the Protocol limit SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines. The agreement contains undertakings not to build such launchers and submarines above a given number.

A ceiling of 62 has been set for the USSR on the

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number of operational modern submarines (Y-class nuclear-powered submarines). A ceiling of 950 SLBM launchers has been set for the USSR. This ceiling is to include all launchers on nuclear-powered submarines (Y-class and H-class submarines) and modern launchers on older submarines (G-class diesel-powered submarines).

In effect, the Agreement freezes SLBM launchers at present levels except that additional SLBM launchers can be built if they replace older strategic launchers on a one-for-one basis.

The Soviets are permitted to have no more than 740 launchers on nuclear-powered submarines of any type, operational and under construction, unless they replace them

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in accordance with agreed procedures. The purpose of the figure 740 is to establish a clear and unambiguous baseline which avoids uncertainty or debate over the definition of "under construction."

To reach 950 SLBMs on modern submarines, the USSR must retire older ballistic missile launchers — specifically, those for SS-7 and SS-8 ICBMs and on H-class submarines. The first SLBM launcher after the 740th launcher must be a replacement. The older ICBM or SLBM launchers being replaced will be dismantled beginning no later than the date on which the submarine containing the 741st launcher begins sea trials.

I might add that this one-way mix concept — permitting

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replacement of land-based launchers with submarine-based launchers — was first suggested by the US early in SALT as a way of achieving greater strategic stability.

The USSR could retain the existing older launchers on G-class submarines, in addition to 950 launchers on modern submarines. However, any launchers for modern SLBMs on these older diesel-powered submarines would have to be included in the 950 ceiling.

The modernization and replacement provisions of the Interim Agreement will permit both sides to improve their missile forces, but the restrictions on converting launchers for light ICBMs or older heavy ICBMs to launchers for modern heavy ICBMs will place important qualitative

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restrictions on Soviet programs. The conversion of current US ICBM launchers to handle Minuteman III missiles and the conversion of current Polaris submarines to handle Poseidon missiles, as well as the construction of new submarines as replacement for older ones, will not be prohibited.

The Agreement provides for application of the same verification procedures and commitments about non-concealment and non-interference as contained in the ABM Treaty. The Standing Consultative Commission will also be used to promote the objectives and the implementation of the Interim Agreement.

There is a commitment to continue active negotiations for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms.

The Agreement also stipulates that its terms will not

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prejudice the scope and terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the follow-on negotiations.

The offensive arms limitations are temporary and not comprehensive. They do not cover all strategic delivery vehicles. For example, strategic bombers, where the US already has a very large advantage, are not limited by the Interim Agreement.

The Interim Agreement does not limit on-going US offensive arms programs. It does stop the Soviet Union from increasing the number of its strategic offensive missile launchers. These limitations on Soviet strategic offensive forces, in conjunction with very low limits on AMEBs on both sides, clearly advance US security interests.

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Looked at overall, our forces are clearly sufficient to protect our, and our Allies', security interests. US strategic forces are qualitatively superior and more effective than Soviet strategic forces. The USSR has more missile launchers. The US has more missile warheads. We have many more strategic bombers. Moreover, numbers alone are not an illuminating or useful measure for judging the strategic balance.

IX.

With these two agreements, we should have a more secure and stable strategic relationship with the USSR.

Both sides gain assurance that their strategic missile deterrent forces will not be rendered ineffective by the other's ABM system.

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But even with the advantages that these two agreements will bring, we must keep our strategic forces up-to-date if these are to continue their central role for deterrence. Our forces must be adequate to deter attack on — or coercion of — the US and its Allies. The relationship between US and Soviet strategic forces must be such that our ability and resolve to protect our vital interests and those of our Allies will not be underestimated by anyone. I am sure the Congress agrees.

X.

Mr. Chairman, I have presented an overview of the basic undertakings of these agreements and of their significance.

- 26 -

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- I think it wrong to ask who "won" or "lost" the initial SALT negotiations. In matters involving the central security interests of two great powers, any arms limitation agreement must respond to each side's interest or it will not last very long. Both sides must gain from SALT or neither does.

With these two agreements we enter a new era in arms control, and what may have been difficult or impossible in the past may now be attainable. It should now be possible for both sides to agree to additional limitations, including reductions.

The security of the United States will be strengthened by these two agreements.

They will make possible a more rational and stable strategic relationship.

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They should help to improve American-Soviet relations and preserve and strengthen international security and world order.

The threat of nuclear war will be dramatically reduced.

These Agreements will give the world greater hope for the future.

Mr. Chairman, I urge that this Committee and the Senate support the ABM Treaty and its accompanying Interim Agreement.

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